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Although the olive crop is one of the most important crops in Tunisian
agriculture, knowledge concerning its marketing, pricing, and channels of
processing from primary producers to ultimate markets is deficient or non-
existent. This situation is in contrast to the broadly known and more
organized market of olive oil derived from Tunisian produced olives. The
linkages between two separate markets, namely the primary market or market
outlets for olives and the wholesale or final market for oil, are simply
interpreted on the basis of available knowledge concerning the marketing
of oil. This type of interpretation implies that the marketing and pro-
cessing margin assessed by wholesalers and processors of olives is uni-
formly fixed and is independent of
olives and the corresponding price
The general objective of this
the level of both the primary price of
of oil.
paper is examination of the validity of
the underlying assumptions concerning the relationship between the actual
primary product price of olives and the corresponding wholesale price of
olive oil, that is, determining whether the structure of the existing
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marketing system is allowing these two sets of prices to be sufficiently
interdependent. Empirical findings to support or reject these underlying
assumptions should have far-reaching implications of the role, efficiency,
and equity of the present pricing system in linking primary producers of
olives with the ultimate market for their product.
The expected type of relationship between primary and wholesale prices
of olives and olive oil in Tunisia can be easily drawn since wholesale
prices of olive oil are nationally regulated.~’ This relationship is often
visualized as having a free competitive setting with efficient pricing
throughout the marketing system. Under these assumed circumstances the
resulting farm price of olives WOUIC1be equal to the wholesale price of
their corresponding oil yield minus the cost of processing and marketing.
In other words, except for temporary situations, the allocations for market-
ing and processing margin would be fixed and independent of the level of
both the primary and wholesale prices. This implies that any change in the
level of either price would have an equivalent impact on the other price and
a derived demand curve for the primary olive product can be established as a
parallel to the given demand curve for the final oil product under all con-
ceivable quantities. The vertical difference between the two demand curves
would be equal to the normal fixed cost of marketing and processing. Conse-
quently, given a fixed range of possible prices for the oil product at the
wholesale market, the level, as well as the distribution of an observed
sample of olive prices at the farm level, can be used as a major indicator
of whether a parallel demand curve for olives and olive oil can be obtained.
The empirical evidence which can be ascertained from these observed farm
prices of olives can, therefore, be used to support or negate the free3
competitive market assumptions which are presumably operating at the
present time in the Tunisian system of olives and olive oil marketing.
Objectives and Procedures
Four specific objectives are sought in this paper. These are as
follows:
(1) To explore the primary olive prices at the farm level as a true
measure of the producer’s return for his crop. This exploration attempt
was undertaken via an actual on the spot survey of olive sale transactions
which took place during the 1971/72 olive crop year.
(2) To relate these prices to their corresponding wholesale values
calculated on the basis of the oil content of the olives. This would pro-
vide an empirical comparison of the nature of the relationship which may
exist between the primary producer price of olives and the wholesale price
of the oil product.
(3) To identify and analyze national and regional olive price discrep-
ancies and distortions by testing the sensitivity of these prices to certain
key elements which should determine their level and distribution under
normal competitive marketing conditions.
(4) To define the nature of marketing implications, based on the above
findings, and to advance appropriate policy recommendations for marketing
reform and pricing efficiency throughout the entire industry.
The first step in undertaking a study of the pricing of a primary
agricultural commodity at the farm level is to provide an adequate inter-
pretation and definition of the type of marketing arrangements and systems
in operation. This includes identification of the principal channels of
marketing which normally connect primary producers of a product with4
intermediate and final market outlets. The type of marketing channels
employed by farm producers would obviously depend on the availability and
cost of reaching these channels by the producers. For this reason, it is
strongly relevant to explore the alternative market channels available and
the degree of farmers’ participation in them.
When evaluating the efficiency of agricultural pricing in terms of
transmitting price information and incentives between primary producers
and markets, an explicit specification must be made regarding the identity
of the price receiver, the form of the product sold, and the location
where the price is paid (or received). In this respect a clear distinction
should be made between the agricultural producer of the primary olive
product and others who deal with the primary or processed product at var-
ious stages of the marketing system such as dealers, middlemen, processors,
and merchants. This distinction is critical in assessing the return to
agricultural producers from the sale of their primary olive product, i.e. ,
the return for their farm activities, in comparison to other prices or
values which might be quoted as a return for handlers, andlor processors
from the sale of olives and olive products.
Olives and their oil products are generally marketed through one or
more of five different marketing outlets. These market outlets are as
follows:
(1) sale of the olive crop on the trees (Khadara),
(2) sale of the harvested olives on the farm,
(3) sale of olives in the product market,
(4) sale of olive oil, the processed product, to the National Office
of Oil (NOH) for domestic and export marketing by NOH, and5
(5) sale of olive oil via traditional arrangements for local and
family consumption.
Each of the above market outlets constitutes an independent stage in
the overall marketing system of the product(s). Consequently, the word
“sale” is used throughout to indicate a transfer of ownership instead of a
third party marketing on behalf of the original producers, such as in the
case of marketing cooperatives. Marketing cooperatives for olives and
their products are not common in Tunisia at the present time. The existence
of these five outlets, however, does not necessarily imply that all olives
go through the entire marketing channel. On the other hand, identification
of the most predominantly used market outlet, in terms of the percentage of
the product which goes through it, can be used as one of the most important
indicators of the degree of production-marketing integration which might
2/
be feasible within this sector.—
Factors Affecting Olive Marketing in Tunisia
A large number of the agricultural products produced in developing
countries reach the final domestic and export markets via multiple and
often complex market channels. This is particularly true where organized
markets and/or producers’ marketing organizations, such as cooperatives,
are either lacking or are deficient. This situation is evident in the
marketing system and the arrangement currently in use for olives in Tunisia.
Farmers or producers of this product tend to rely on a particular type of
market outlet, depending on the various economic , managerial, and marketing
factors affecting their production units in relation to the functions and
role of the available markets and market institutions. When discussing6
the present system of agricultural marketing of olives in Tunisia,
several of these important factors should be identified.
First,
3/
olives are a highly perishable product.— The harvested crop
requires immediate processing since the quality, and consequently the
value , of the derived olive oil product depend on the time which elapses
between actual harvesting and processing. In Tunisia this is a crucial
factor where quality-preserving technologies, such as refrigeration, appro-
priate storage, and suitable transportation facilities, are lacking. The
perishability of the olive crop implies that a farm producer must identify,
or contract with, a processing facility or a marketing channel which will
receive his crop immediately after harvesting. Otherwise, olive producers
without an immediate market outlet or a processing facility to purchase or
transform their crop would be subject to great risk of market vagaries or
product deterioration. This situation might be complicated when harvest-
ing has to be performed within a limited period of product maturity and
under permissible climatic conditions.
The second important factor which affects the selection of a certain
type of market outlet for olives is the availability of capital, labor, and
management inputs at the farm level. Sizable amounts of these inputs are
required to transform the raw olive crop into a commercially valuable
4/
olive oil product which can be traded over an extended period of time.—
Producers with sufficient amounts of these inputs to undertake production
and marketing of olives or their products, obviously are in a better posi-
tion to subscribe to the most profitable market outlets, in contrast to
those with only limited inputs. Consequently, small or subsistence pro-
ducers of olives who do not have access to these marketing inputs can only
rely on the most immediate market to sell their product as a cash crop.7
The thtrd important element which is often cited as a crucial determ-
inant of olive market outlets in Tunisia is the nature of the land tenure
system where this”crop is produced. This factor determines the type of
ownership and control over the crop and its marketing. This can best be
illustrated by the case of absentee, multiple, or state ownership of a
large number of olive production units where actual farm operators of these
units are either tenants, laborers, or sharecroppers who usually have no
control over the marketing of the crop. It has been observed that in a
large number of these cases marketing decisions are often made to avoid a
great amount of involvement and control over the crop after its maturity.s’
The fourth important factor which normally affects olive marketing in
Tunisia is the location of the farm with respect to the commodity’s market-
ing and processing centers. Problems associated with road accessibility
to farms, particularly during rainy seasons or in areas which are exposed
to frequent flooding, are often cited as a major factor limiting the market-
ing choices available to these farmers. Olive farmers in isolated areas
with no adequate transportation facilities of their own obviously are more
restricted in marketing their product compared to those who have a close
access to nearby marketing or processing centers.
Finally, the role which is traditionally played by the existing market-
ing institutions in their relation to farm producers of olives is also a
factor in determining the type of marketing outlet used by these producers.
The reliance of a large number of olive farmers with only limited resource
endowments and marketing skills on certain types of marketing institutions
is often explained by the fact that farmers receive other needed production
services. Essential services, such as the provision of credit, production,8
and food supplies, are usually performed by marketing entrepreneurs in
order to maintain a steady cliental marketing relationship with farmers
who demand, but are unable to obtain, these services from other channels.
In this case, olives as a cash crop are presumably used by these marketing






A hypothetical price and price equivalent relationship for olives and
olive oil at the various stages of the marketing channel can be established
and used as a bench mark for evaluating the actual prices which might appear
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at these marketing stages.— This relationship can be clearly constructed
on the basis of the fixed minimum wholesale prices of olive oil guaranteed
by the Tunisian National Office of Oil (NOH). The difference between the
wholesale price of olive oil and prices paid for olives in other marketing
channels should represent the actual cost of transformation of the product
from one stage to the next. The obvious assumption here is that the guar-
anteed olive oil price, which is known to all producers and handlers of the
product, can be interpreted in terms of equivalent prices of olives at the
various levels of the marketing system, given sufficient knowledge concern-
ing the expected oil yield and the actual cost of transformation.
For the purpose of illustration, a hypothetical structure of olive and
olive oil prices is shown in Table 1. The derived olive prices shown in
this table are calculated on the basis of the following assumptions: (1)
20 percent oil yield, (2) 280 dinars per ton as a minimum wholesale price
of oil, (3) transformation costs include 6 dinars for olive harvesting.9
Table 1. Hypothetical price and price equivalent relationship of
olives and olive oil in Tunisia at various stages of
the marketing channel (20 percent oil yield).
Prices
Marketing Channel Olives oil
. . dinars per ton .
Olive crop on the tree (Khadara)a 44 220
Harvested olives on the farm 50 250
Product market for olives 52 260
Olive oil wholesale market (fixed) 56 280
Olive oil domestic retail market (fixed) 80 400
aAn olive production tax of about 2 dinars per ton is
required at the farm level. An additional tax on the processor of
about 2 dinars per ton of the olives is presumably levied as a
semi.ce or income tax. In reality, however, the incident of this
taxation is eventually carried to the original producers of olives
as a commodity tax in the form of either a lower price for the
product sold or a higher processing cost. The normal procedure
is to collect the total charge of these taxes of 4 dinars per ton
from the olive oil processors who are allowed to charge the total
sum as a part of the per unit cost of processing. This system,
despite its apparent inequities to farm producers of the product,
is presumably designed to insure control and facilitate the col-
lection of these commodity taxes. As a result of this, the total
cost of processing which is often quoted as the official maximum
which can be charged to farmers who choose to process their
olives, is 8 dinars per ton instead of 4 dinars which is the aver-
age real cost of processing exclusive of all taxes (i.e., produc-
tion, processing and/or income taxes). Recently this cost has
been raised to 10 dinars per ton by a government order.10
2 dinars for transportation, and 4 dinars for processing. A similar
structure of feasible olive prices can be established for all conceivable
8/
oil yields and qualities.— In all of these hypothetical price relation-
ships, the allowance for the marketing and transformation margin should
remain constant and independent of the level of both the wholesale price
of the processed oil product and other prices of the primary olive crop.
Under this hypothetical price structure, commercial producers of the
primary olive crop would be indifferent to the extent of the marketing
activities which they might be willing to undertake when dispensing their
crop. Also, any discrepancies which mi~ht appear between prices at the
first stage of the marketing channel and other intermediate or ultimate
wholesale prices of the crop or its oil content should be temporary in
nature.z/ This type of marketing structure implies that in the long run
an efficient pricing system between primary producers and markets would
prevail. These producers should be able to receive the full price incen-
tive determined by the market regardless of the extent of their actual
marketing participation.
Khadara Market System
The sale of oil olives while the fruit is still ripening on the trees
(Khadara) is a well known marketing practice in the olive culture of Tunisia.
This unique marketing system is also frequently used for selling other impor-
tant tree crops such as citrus fruits, apricots, and almonds. Khadara trans-
actions normally take place between private farmers or managers of state
farms, as sellers of olives on the trees, and Khadars, as professional
middlemen and/or processors who buy the crop for processing and commercial
marketing. The formal format of sale resembles a public auction taking place11
at a specific time and place, and with an auctioneer who conducts and
10/
reports the biddings.— Samples of the crop and estimates of the quantity
of the harvest, however, are not offered at the time of the Khadara sale.
These two important elements which determine the expected value of the crop
are usually not disclosed to the public. This type of situation provides
a great deal of speculation in the Khadara marketing institution in compar-
ison with other forms of commercial public sales.
The reliance on the Khadara market system might be explained by various
economic, management, and technical factors. Some of the more important
factors which often compel the utilization of Khadara as a marketing outlet
for olives are (1) the acute need for immediate cash income by a large
number of small or subsistence
securing their return from the





the climatic and market
the relatively large labor
requirements essential in undertaking a timely commercial harvesting, and
(3) the incentives and management needs required to control and coordinate
the harvesting operations with other transformation activities, i.e.,
assembly, transportation, and processing. The impact of one or more of
these factors is apparently influencing a great number of primary producers
of olives to depend on Khadara as a primary marketing outlet for their
product.
Although there is no precise estimate of the utilization extent of the
Khadara marketing institution in the total marketing system of olives in
Tunisia, it is evident that Khadara is presently used by a large number of
owners, controllers, and/or producers of olives who are either unable or
unwilling to undertake further steps in marketing their crop beyond the12
point of maturity. g’ For example, Khadara is heavily used by absentee
or multiple owners of olive production units in order to avoid management
problems and responsibilities which might be encountered when attempting
to reach alternative markets. The types of farms included in this category
are numerous, including a large number of extensive and relatively pros-
perous state farms and also other forms of private and public farm estates
which are mutually owned by various individuals or which are designated
for specific religious or common benefits (habous).
The Khadara sales and the corresponding farm prices derived from them,
reported in this study, are based on a national survey of 105 Khadara state
farm sale transactions which took place in major olive producing regions
of the country. Data on each individual state farm sale conducted by the
Office des Terres Domaniales (OTD) are collected at the time of these
Khadara transactions. The estimates used concerning the expected size of
the olive harvest and its oil yield are based on the accepted field esti-
mates which were made available to the seller (OTD) at the time of sale.
The final sale value of each Khadara includes all additional charges and
taxes imposed as terms of the sale. The selection and reporting of a
Khadara pricing sample is also based on a reasonable knowledge of market
price indicators of olives, oil yields, and a minimum level of olive pro-
ductivity of the trees offered for sale.g’
Khadara Speculation
A high degree of speculation is normally attached to the Khadara
system of marketing. Speculation is usually induced by the lack of suffi-
cient and reliable information concerning the size of the olive crop, its
oil yield, and the corresponding market value of the final olive oil product.13
An estimate of the size of the olive harvest , at the time when the
fruit is still ripening on the trees, on each farm offered for Khadara is
arrived at only through visual inspection of the trees. The accuracy of
the estimates made either by the farmer, farm manager, or the Khadar
(buyer) cannot be verified. Consequently, an unknown margin of error
always remains between the actual yield of olives after harvest and the
corresponding estimate made before harvesting prior to the time of sale.
In most cases appraisals of olive yields are made on an individual basis,
resulting in a wide range of estimates depending on the skill and objec-
tivity of the estimator.
Despite these shortcomings, estimates of the expected total yield of
olives for each farm offered for Khadara have to be made prior to the time
of sale. The estimation procedures are usually made on the spot via visual
inspection of the reported number of productive trees and estimation of
their corresponding levels of production. These estimations are often
carried out either by considering the average yield of all the trees on the
farm or by grouping a certain number of adjacent trees (Setour) and estima-
ting their corresponding yields. The estimator presumably would look for
the size of the trees, i.e., height, density, and circumference, or the
number of producing branches and their corresponding yields. It has been
said by olive traders that the more experienced estimators can arrive at a
reasonable estimate closely approximating the actual level of olive yield
per tree. This, however, cannot be confirmed unless the estimates are veri-
fied after harvesting. The probability of error obviously would increase
when a large number of trees are involved and/or when an experienced and
objective estimator cannot be found or used.The other important factor which is often left to speculative predic-
tions at the time of Khadara is the expected oil yield of olives offered
for sale. In most cases oil yield estimates are made entirely on a sub-
jective basis by the parties participating in the Khadara. A common prac-
tice in estimating general oil yields by a buyer is to crush a single olive
between the fingers to feel the oil content. Obviously, buyers of olives
with processing facilities of their own are more experienced in doing this
type of oil test, as they have the chance to verify their estimates after
actual crushing and processing. These buyers, and particularly those who
bought the olive crop in earlier years, are better informed about previous
average oil yields on a specific farm. Consequently, several speculative
oil yields are often quoted depending on the scope and accuracy of informa-
tion available. On the other hand, farmers or sellers of olives without
access to processing facilities to test or verify the oil content of their
olives must rely on a rather general estimate of the actual oil yield
which cannot be confirmed at the time of sale.
Finally, farmers or sellers of olives via Khadara often do not have
access to reliable information regarding the cost of transforming their
olives into olive oil. This situation, of course, tends to intensify the
degree of uncertainty about the actual value of the crop and, consequently,
would increase the amount of speculation in determining its sale value at
the farm. Numerous problems are usually cited in estimating the total cost
of transforming an olive crop from a particular farm to the final olive oil
available for the wholesale market. This is particularly true when estimat-
ing the management cost of these numerous operations from the farm to the
market.15
Table 2. Estimates of Khadara olive prices achieved in Tunisia during
1971/72 crop year.
Sfax Sousse Kairouan Tunis Nabeul Jendouba Beja Bizerte























p* = 53 30
F = 55 35






































































































p* = Median price which is the middle value of the price distribution.
F = Simple average price of olives in dinars.
ii = Reported percent average yield of oil.
F
— = Price equivalent of olives in terms of corresponding oil yield,
z dinars per ton.16
Khadara Prices of Olives
Table 2 shows the final estimates of
in Tunisia during the 1971/72 crop year.
Khadara prices of olives sold
These estimates were made from
the state farm sales between
private buyers contracted as
individual sale of an entire
the Office des Terres Domaniales (OTD) and
Khadara. Each price estimate is based on an
olive crop on a farm. That is, the price is
calculated using the final sale value of
ante, and other expenses, divided by the
the crop, including taxes, insur-
best estimate of the total expected
volume of harvested olives. Crop estimates of individual farms were made
by the OTD prior to the time of sale.~’ The resulting prices shown in
Table 2, which are based on an actual national survey of contract sales of
olives, are considered the best indicative
ducer prices.
Several key observations can be drawn
approximation of farm or pro-
when evaluating the general
level and distribution of the price data shown in Table 2. First, the
observed range of these prices can be related to the feasible price bound-
aries allowed under the present system of market and price control for oil.
The boundaries of olive prices can be easily established when sufficient
knowledge concerning oil yields and prices is specified. Oil yields of
olives sold under the reported Khadara system ranged between a minimum of
17 percent to a maximum of 28 percent, while the range of the guaranteed
wholesale price of olive oil is fixed by the National Office of Oil as
between 250 and 280 dinars per ton. Given these ranges of oil yields and
prices, along with reasonable estimates of the cost of olive transformation,
feasible price boundaries of olives can be shown in the following diagram.Table 3. Feasible boundaries of olive prices under specific
wholesale prices of oil, oil yields, and the costs





Guaranteed Wholesale Price of Oil (Dinars/Ton
250 255 260 270 280
x > x+5
“It is assumed that each percentage point of oil yield of
olives should pay out between 25 to 28 dinars per ton of olives at
the reported levels of oil yield. For calculation purposes of these
boundaries see O. A1-Zand, Producer Prices for Olives and Olive Oil
in Tunisia, Staff Paper P71-21, Department of Agricultural and
Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, October 1971, p. 14.
The above diagram shows that the maximum feasible price disparity of
olives should not exceed 36 dinars per ton. This price “difference is
between the value of olives which have the lowest oil yield (17 percent)
of the lowest quality (lampante at 250 dinars per ton) and the value of
olives which have the highest oil yield (28 percent) of the highest
quality (super at 280 dinars per ton).
It is obvious that the maximum feasible price disparity between olive
prices of extreme oil yield and quality indexes is significantly lower
than the actual price disparities shown in Table 2. For example, an inter-
regional comparison between the highest price achieved in Sfax and the
lowest price reached in individual producing regions reveals a minimum
disparity of 62 dinars per ton (highest price in Sfax minus the lowest18
price in Bizerte) and a
price in Sfax minus the
these price disparities
maximum price disparity
maximum disparity of 81 dinars per ton (highest
lowest price in Beja). The overall average of
is about 70 dinars per ton, or about twice the
allowed for olives of extreme quality differences.
At the regional level, Sfax prices show the maximum disparity among pro-
ducing regions of 64 dinars per ton.
Olive price dispersions among regions is also shown to be reflected
by the large differences between the maximum prices achieved in the high
priced region (Sfax) compared to the other producing regions. For example,
the maximum olive price achieved in Sfax is 39 percent higher (or 25 dinars
per ton) than the next highest price paid for olives in other regions. On
the other hand, olive price dispersions among regions are shown to be more
uniform at the lower end of the price range.
Second, considerable difference is also evident in the overall price
levelof olives which are sold in various parts of the country. The price
level of olives sold in each region is shown as either the medium (P*) or
the simple average of the Khadara prices reported in these regions (~).
Since these prices are shown without their corresponding oil yields, (~)
or (P*) can be considered as the best possible approximations of the over-
all prices of all olives sold in each region as a homogeneous product. A
significant difference in the price level is particularly evident when
comparing average price indicators achieved in Sfax with those reached in
the rest of the country. The Sfax price is about 38 percent higher than
the average price realized in other producing regions. This significant
price difference must be viewed on the assumption that the overall average
14/
oil yield of olives produced in each region is comparable.—19
Furthermore, regional price distortions continue to be strongly
evident when comparing average regional prices corrected by correspond-
[1
i?
ing oil yields = , In this case the corresponding oil equivalent prices
R
of olives can be considered as the standardized price of all olives as a
homogeneous product. Consequently, these prices should be compared directly.
This implies that when the price of the final olive oil product is fixed,
it must follow that the standardized regional prices of olives should be
more or less uniform. The resulting prices shown in Table 2, however,
exhibit a great degree of incompatibility, particularly when comparing
the standardized average price achieved in Sfax with those in other pro-
ducing regions. In this situation the Sfax price continues to maintain
its high premium over all other regional prices except Bizerte. T%is Sfax
premium amounts to about 40 percent in comparison with prices received in
Sousse, Kairouan and Nabeul.
Finally, the price series values shown in Table 2 fall in a limited
range. For example, 65 percent of the total observed prices (or 68 out of
the 105 price observations) fall on or below 40 dinars per ton. This
tendency is significantly stronger in the seven producing regions, excluding
Sfax, where 76 percent of the observed prices are equal to or less than 40
dinars per ton. This group of prices, which can be called mode prices,
might be considered the most representative of the level of prices possible
under the Khadara marketing system.
Analysis of Prices
The Khadara prices of olives reported in Table 2 are analyzed using
three kinds of tests to attempt evaluation of the sensitivity of these
prices to actual marketing cc!nditions. Each test will utilize the best20
available estimates of costs, prices, and price deviations which are
most feasible in the real market situation of olives and olive oil in
Tunisia. The sensitivity of Khadara prices of olives is tested by relating
these prices to:
(1) the corresponding yield and value of oil,
(2) the existing market prices of olives, and
(3) a reasonable allowance of possible price distribution.
Oil Yield and Value
Although all the value of oil olives produced and sold as such is
derived from the value of their oil content, the exact oil yield of olives
is usually not known by the farmer or seller of the product at the time of
sale. Independent estimates of oil yield are made, however, by expected
buyers-processors of Khadara via
farm. The estimates, of course,
time of Khadara.
individual inspection of olives at the
are not revealed by these buyers at the
On the other hand, more general historical estimates are often quoted
by producers indicating the level of oil yield previously obtained on
their farms. These estimates are considered as the minimum base yield of
oil which should be obtained from olives produced on these farms in any
given year. Oil yields of olives sold by OTD farms via Khadara are obtained
directly from the individual producers or managers. These yields are con-
sidered the best average indicator of the oil yield of olives sold as they
are accepted by OTD at the time of sale. The sensitivity of the resulting
Khadara prices are tested against the corresponding value equivalent of oil
15/
obtained from these quoted yields.—
Whenever the oil yield of olives can be determined, its corresponding21
value can simply be derived, since minimum producer prices of olive oil
are fixed. These prices are paid to producers or sellers of olive oil
according to quality. Five distinct grades of quality are fixed in terms
of the free fatty acid content of the olive oil offered for sale to the
National Office of Oil. Consequently, for each quality of olives measured
in terms of its oil yield, there is a range of five possible prices or
values reflecting the difference in the grade of the oil sold.~’
Khadara prices of olives are examined in terms of their corresponding
values , which are measured on the basis of the given yields and the
assumed cost of transforming olives from the farm into the olive oil
product. The results are shown in Table 4.
The range of prices achieved in each yield category is compared with a
range of prices calculated on the basis of specific assumptions regarding
the value and cost of the olive oil content expected from each yield. The
number of actual price observations which fall outside the calculated range
are rejected as being economically unrealistic in terms of the value of the
olive oil product (last column). According to this criterion, Table 4
shows that 68 of the Khadara prices reported, or 65 percent of all price
observations, are rejected as being unrealistic. This represents a sig-
nificant portion of the price observations reported. It also can be seen
in Table 4 that in the most frequently quoted average oil yield category
of 20 percent, the number of price observations rejected is more than three
times the number of price observations which are accepted. It is recognized
that this result might be partly a reflection of some degree of misrepresen-
tation of this average yield category since it is often used as a general












































reservation, however, can be substantiated only when specification of
this yield with respect to each transaction is verified. At the present
time, however, this yield is the one most often quoted in many olive sale
transactions. In the case of the Khadara sales reported, a 20 percent
yield is quoted for about 40 percent of all transactions.
Another crucial indicator of the extent of Khadara price distortions
can also be measured in terms of the minimum-maximum price ratio reported
for each oil yield category. These ratios, Table 4 (column 5), should be
compared to the normal standard ratio of 75 percent, which is based on the
price range considered possible for each class of yield (column 3). It is
evident from this comparison that in almost all cases the actual minimum-
maximum Khadara price ratios are substantially lower than the normal 75
percent. This strongly points out that the Khadara pricing system permits
considerably wider pricing extremes than what might be considered an
acceptable normal range. This phenomenon further underlines the speculative
elements existing in this system of marketing.
The comparability of the reported Khadara prices, as farm level prices,
with the corresponding wholesale value equivalents can also be empirically
evaluated by a simple regression technique. The following mixed results
are obtained when regressing
on the corresponding Khadara
these calculated wholesale price equivalents
prices reported in this paper:
(1) Tunisia W = 34.6809 -I- 0.3095 F
R2 = 0.28 N = 105 (14.28)
(2) Beja w= 39.1340 + 0.1079 F
R’ = 0.20 N = 16 (15.27)24
(3) Tunis W = 37.4412 -t- 0.0938 F
R2 = O.11 N = 22 (15.56)
(4) Sfax w= 55.5666 + 0.1037 F
~2 = 0.09 N=22 (12.17)
Where:
w= wholesale price equivalent of olives,
F = Khadara farm price of olives,
~2 . coefficient of determination,
N= number of price observations.
Numbers in parentheses are “t” values.
The above linear regression equations fail to reveal a significant
correlation between farm and wholesale prices of olives. When regressing
equivalent wholesale prices on all Tunisia Khadara prices reported, only
28 percent of the variation in the wholesale price (R2) can be explained
by the variation in the corresponding Khadara price. In all of the above
regression estimates, the size (slope) of the linear regression coefficient
is significantly different from 1.0. This seems to imply that (1) farm
prices are independent of wholesale prices, (2) marketing margins are not
independent of these prices and, consequently, (3) there is strong evidence
that price irregularities andlor distortions do exist in the present
17/
system of Khadara pricing.—
Market Prices of Olives
Khadara prices of olives can also be evaluated using the reference
18/
market prices quoted in each producing region at the time of Khadara.—
Regional market prices are considered as another approximation of the
market value of the primary product sold in the respective regions. These25
prices may vary over the harvesting season, reflecting changes in the oil
and moisture content of the olives , which in turn are subject to changing
climatic conditions affecting the maturity and quality of the fruit. On
the other hand, since the final market prices of olive oil are uniformly
fixed across the count:ry, a stable relationship should be expected between
these prices and the actual market price of olives. Theoretically this
requires that each class of olives of a specific oil content and of a
certain quality should receive the same price regardless of its place of
origin. That is, producers of olives and olive oil are facing an infinitely
elastic demand for their products at a specific known price which is
nationally fixed by the government.
The relationship between average market and Khadara prices of olives
at the regional level is shown in Table 5. Except for Sfax and to a lesser
degree for Sousse, these two sets of average prices of olives are consis-
tent.~1 A positive difference between the market price in any given
region and the corresponding Khadara price should be assigned as the olives
transformation margin. This includes the cost of harvesting and transpor-
tation services required to bring olives to the market center. The normal
cost estimated for these services is usually specified at 6 and 2 dinars
per ton of olives for harvesting and transportation, respectively. The
level of transformation shown implies that farmers in Kairouan, Tunis,
Jendouba, Beja, and Bizerte do not have a strong price’advantage in the
market place in comparison to Khadara. On the contrary, the Khadara aver-
age price in Sfax is shown to be considerably more favorable to farmers
than the average market price quoted in the market center of Sfax.
It must be emphasized here that any meaningful interpretation which26
Table 5. Average market and Khadara prices of olives and the
transformation margin recorded at the beginning of the
1971/72 olive crop year.
Transformation
Region Market price Khadara price margin
. . . . . . . . dlnars per ton. . . . . . . . .
Sfax 51 55 -4
Sousse 35 35 0
Kairouan 35 30 5
Tunis 46 36 10
Jendouba 41 34 7
Beja 46 37 9
Bizerte 46 38 8
Tunisia (Average) 43 38 5
.—.27
can be drawn from comparing Khadara prices with the reported regional
market prices of olives ought to be carefully considered. The reported
market prices are not necessarily representative of the actual farm price
in any particular region. This is explained by the fact that most olives
brought to the market place, particularly in the Sfax market center, are
marketed via professional dealers or Khadars for their own benefit. On
the other hand, both the average market and the Khadara prices shown in





at the market place. The difference between these two price
does not appear to be sufficiently adequate to provide strong
to olive farmers to market their output in the market place
direct selling through Khadara. This is in addition to the fact
that organized marketing centers for olives are not always available.
The comparison of average market and Khadara prices of olives in
Tunisia might also reveal that buyers of the commodity can interchangeably
utilize both channels to obtain olives for immediate processing or subse-
quent selling, depending on the local price condition and the cost of
transformation services. In this case, market prices of olives which
appear in the market center can only be regarded as an extension of Khadara,
the more dominant system of price making of olives in Tunisia.
Khadara Price Distribution
Khadara price distribution provides another test of the responsive-
ness of these prices to the actual market values of olive oil in Tunisia.
This distribution can be constructed on the basis of corresponding value
prices which in turn are based on the actual oil yield value of olives
sold by each individual Khadara transaction.28
The distribution of Khadara prices around their corresponding value
price equivalents is shown in Table 6. It is shown on the basis of the
difference between each Khadara price and its corresponding value price.
This difference is expressed in terms of a percent deviation of the
Khadara price in comparison with the corresponding value price. The number
of Khadara price observations which fall within a specific range of
corresponding value prices (negative or positive) is indicated. For exam-
ple, in the Sfax region the Khadara price distribution for 22 cases shows
that 16 price observations, or 73 percent of all Khadara prices reported
in that region, are inferior to their corresponding value prices (f-).
The rest of the 6 prices, or 27 percent of all prices, are superior to
their corresponding value prices (f+). The distribution of prices within
the positive and negative distribution ranges is also shown. For example,
5 of the Khadara prices reported in Sfax are shown to be more than 40
percent inferior when compared with their value equivalent. On the other
hand, only one price observation falls on the corresponding positive side.
The absolute (n) and relative distributions (n/f and n/F) of Khadara prices
with respect to their corresponding values are shown for all major olive
producing regions of Tunisia.
The overall Khadara price distribution shows a strong negative bias.
When comparing all Khadara prices reported with their corresponding values,
Table 6 shows that 77 percent of these prices are below their value in oil
equivalent terms. Khadara prices which are more than 20 percent below
their corresponding values account for 49 percent of all prices. On the
positive side, only 23 percent of all Khadara prices are above their corres-













The central tendency of the Khadara price distribution shows that only
31 percent of the observations reported are within a 20 percent range of
equivalent norm value prices. Half of these observations are within a 10
percent range. This can be compared with normal statistical distribution
of value prices where 67 and 95 percent of expected prices would fall
20/ within 17 and 34 percent of the average price, respectively.—
The percentage distribution of Khadara prices and their corresponding
21/
olive oil values are pictured graphically in Figure l.— This figure
clearly shows that about 80 percent of all Khadara price observations are
22/
inferior to their corresponding values (i.e., the 100 percent mark).—
The entire price distribution is also shown to be negatively distorted by
about 20 percent when contrasted with a normal distribution.
Conclusions
The principal objective of this study was to explore and analyze actual
producers prices and the price formation of olives in Tunisia as a primary
agricultural crop sold at the farm level. An on the spot survey of olive
sale transactions contracted as Khadara during the 1971/72 crop year was
used as the prime source in identifying the actual level and distribution
of primary producer prices of olives. Despite its many shortcomings and
speculative nature, Khadara is currently used in Tunisia as a traditional
marketing institution and is the most direct market outlet for a large
number of producers who need to sell their crop for immediate cash. This
outlet is often offered as the only market alternative where adequate incen-
tives, credit , marketing facilities, and management skills are not avail-
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after crop maturity. In these cases, Khadara provides an essential market
security for the highly perishable agro-industrial oil olives.
The general level and distribution of producersl prices derived from
the reported Khadara transactions show a considerable disparity from the
feasible range of olive prices calculated on the basis of the given yields
and the regulated olive oil prices. The difference between maximum and
minimum prices achieved is shown to be significantly higher than the pos-
sible price differences which can be explained by the extreme olive quality
differences in terms of oil yield and grade. Interregional price compari-
sons reveal a sizable distortion between Khadara prices in different
regions. These distortions are strongly evident when average regional
prices were corrected by corresponding oil yield levels. Price distortions
are particularly noticeable when comparing the relatively high prices paid
for olives in Sfax with those paid in other important producing regions.
The general tendency of the Khadara prices shown indicates that about 65
percent of them are equal or inferior to 40 dinars per ton. This percentage
goes up to 76 percent when Sfax prices are excluded,
Detailed analysis of Khadara prices suggests that they are largely
independent when related to their corresponding oil yields, market values,
and the most probable normal statistical distribution. Simple linear
regression analysis of Khadara and corresponding wholesale prices fail to
reveal any statistically significant relationship between these two sets of
prices. In all the cases tested the slope of the regression coefficient
obtained was significantly different from 1.0. This result can be advanced
as strong evidence of price incompatibility at different stages of the
market channel. This is a clear indication of serious pricing inefficiencies33
within the olive oil industry. A further test, using oil yields and
values as price indicators, shows that 65 percent of Khadara farm prices
do not conform with the range of value prices allowed for each yield
category fixed on the basis of oil quality differences. Almost half of
these nonconforming prices fall within the most commonly quoted olive
oil yield category of 20 percent.
Except in the case of Sfax, the relationship between Khadara prices
reported and the casual market prices of olives quoted at the time of
Khadara appears to be consistent. This consistency provides another indi-
cation of the influence of the Khadara marketing practice on the entire
olive market price situation and is explained by the dominance of this
practice in comparison with product market sales. Consequently, the
relative discrepancy between market producer prices of olives (Khadara
price minus the marketing margin required to bring olives to the product
market) and the wholesale price equivalent of olives in terms of their oil
yield and value remains the same.
Finally, the overall distribution of Khadara prices along their
corresponding mean values indicates that 80 percent of these prices are
distributed (Figure 1) to the left side of the 100 percent value equivalent
(i.e., negatively skewed). About 50 percent of these prices are shown to
be more than 20 percent inferior to their corresponding values. This type
of skewed distribution is, of course, significantly different from any
normal price variance which might be expected if price errors or distortions
are randomly distributed (i.e., have no negative or positive biases).34
Policy Implications
The foregoing producers’ price exploration and analysis should be con-
sidered as a first step only in evaluating the overall market structure,
systems, operations, and performance affecting the pricing of a primary
agricultural product at the farm level. Further research analysis is
required to examine the role and efficiency of the existing marketing
institutions, including Khadara, for the purpose of introducing possible
marketing reforms and more efficient pricing systems for primary producers.
This study underscores the critical need for more reliable information
and systematic reporting on actual farm prices of olives as the vital pri-
mary product of the olive oil economy. Adequate price information should
be of considerable value to farm producers, dealers, and processors of
olives in planning and determining their production and marketing activities.
Government policy makers also need this type of information when assessing
the efficiency of the existing marketing system and programs in terms of
transmitting price incentives to the primary producers of the product.
Responsive and adequate farm prices should be of considerable value
in facilitating the achievement of various policy objectives. The most
important objectives in traditional olive culture are (1) to integrate
small and subsistence producers of the primary product into a national
commercial marketing system, (2) to give adequate incentives to expand the
level of production and improve quality, (3) to introduce more appropriate
resource allocation in terms of more equitable price sharing, and (4) to
encourage a more efficient system of marketing and processing practices
from the standpoint of timing, space allocation, and technology of the
transformation operations.35
The producers’ price analysis shown in this paper points out the
existence of two distinct and largely unrelated markets -- one for the
primary olive product and the other for the processed olive oil product.
This implication is supported by the great degree of variability in the
marketing margin exhibited in the sample studied between corresponding
prices at the primary and processed levels. This variability is particu-
larly evident in the areas where primary product markets are completely
unorganized (i.e., all regions except Sfax), Excessive allowances for
marketing margins, beyond the actual cost of transformation, implies that
a pure profit is accruing to middlemen by way of price manipulation at the
primary product level. If price discrepancies between these two markets
are maintained in the long run, it implies that certain key market character-
istics and/or imperfections, other than those which are assumed in a free
competitive market, are affecting pricing behavior at the primary level.
In a noncompetitive setting, two major hypotheses can be advanced to
explain the resulting pricing behavior. First, a variable and largely
excessive marketing margin can only be maintained through monopolistic
pricing and market power exercised by buyers of the product at the primary
level. This hypothesis can be supported by the existing market structure
influencing the price making forces of olives operating at the farm level
in contrast to the ultimate market situation of the final olive oil product.
Various degrees of monopsony pricing techniques are possible, given the
nature of the olive market structure. This structure is characterized by
(1) a large number of small scale or subsistence producers who are scattered
over wide geographical areas across the country, (2) lack of effective
marketing or producer cooperatives to undertake the selling of olives on36
behalf of the primary producers or to strengthen their bargaining power
as sellers of a cash crop, (3) absence of adequate knowledge concerning
the cost of transformation and the net ultimate value of the product at
the final market, (4) the relatively high degree of risk associated with
the perishability of olives along with the requirements for numerous and
rather costly processing and transformation services, (5) lack of widespread
and organized product market centers at the primary stage, and (6) a highly
restricted entry to the processing and marketing industry for primary pro-
ducers of olives because of cost and technical barriers.
The analysis of producers’ pricing performance shown in this study can
be used as strong evidence to support the existence of monopsony pricing
behavior in the primary market for olives in Tunisia. Further data and
information concerning the above structural characteristics of the primary
olive market are required to provide additional evidence of the monopsony
pricing hypothesis.
Policy measures implied from this situation suggest the need for
effective modifications of the most critical market structure elements
associated with monopsony pricing behavior by marketing firms and insti-
tutions. Policy measures and programs to institute marketing cooperatives
or comparable mutual marketing schemes to market the product on behalf of
the primary producers should be of considerable value to enhance the bar-
gaining power of these producers and make the prices received by them more
responsive to market values. Another urgently needed measure to improve
the marketing system of olives in Tunisia is implementation of a market
information scheme for the purpose of assembly and dissemination of key
market data on a“timely and regular basis. This should include knowledge37
of the availability and cost of marketing inputs to producers, such as
cash credit and transportation facilities. All these institutional pro-
cesses can be evolved from the present marketing and pricing system without
drastically changing the entire market structure or the principles upon
which it is based.
The second hypothesis which can be advanced in analyzing the resulting
producer prices of olives is that only regional pricing distortions exist
presently when comparing the Sfax market price with those of the other
producing regions of the country. The implication of this hypothesis sug-
gests that Sfax market prices are sufficiently adequate in terms of their
responsiveness to actual market conditions and in the transference of
their full incentives to primary producers of the product in comparison
to those existing in other regions. If this is the case, policy measures
should be directed toward introducing the positive aspects of commercial
olive marketing in Sfax into the other producing regions. The Sfax market
is considered here as a model in focusing policy measures for overall
improvement of the olive marketing system. Some of the positive elements
of the olive market structure which can be explored for policy decisions are
(1) the commercial market organization and the system of marketing informa-
tion dissemination, (2) the allocation of marketing and processing facili-
ties in relation to the size of the crop marketed, (3) the extent of cooper-
ative marketing or production-processing integration, (4) the nature of
management skills and entrepreneurial abilities available, and (5) the
control methods exercised in coordinating harvesting and processing opera-
tions.
In summary, any policy implications which can be derived from this38
study greatly depend on the nature and extent of pricing inefficiencies
or distortions which might be visualized when evaluating primary producer
prices of olives resulting from the present system of marketing via KAadara.
It is clearly evident, however, that a provision of more responsive market
alternatives to primary producers of this product for more efficient and
equitable pricing should be considered a principal policy goal.FOOTNOTES
During the early 1960’s a new market organization for the Tunisian
olive oil economy was introduced. The apparent objective was to main-
tain a production and export advantage in olive oil as an important
domestic food commodity and as a principal source of foreign exchange
earnings. Government regulations were designed to guarantee the flow
of olive oil exports despite production fluctuations and resulting
deficits in domestic supplies. The organization primarily entailed
state control of marketing, pricing, and exporting of olive oil as
well as permitting state imports of cheaper substitute oils to supple-
ment domestic requirements for edible purposes. A more significant
step was taken in organizing the olive oil market beginning with the
1967/68 crop year when the entire wholesale pricing of olive oil was
assumed by the National Office of Oil (NOH). This included a guaranteed
minimum price for the final olive oil product according to quality.
These prices are to be announced at the beginning of each olive produc-
tion year with a possible price supplement to be paid at the end of the
marketing season. The NOH was made the sole national agency to pur-
chase olive oil at these prices for domestic and export marketing. The
market organization of olive oil, however, has had little implication
for the primary producers and sellers of olives as an agricultural crop.
Nevertheless, it has been assumed that market organization of the oil
sector will eventually be reflected in the market for the primary olive40
product. This opinion is obviously based on the understanding that a
free competitive market force among marketing and processing institu-
tions would fully transmit market changes and incentives to the primary
producers of the olive crop.
2_/ Although data does not exist at present to verify the most predomi-
nantly used market outlet by agricultural producers of oil olives in
Tunisia, it is quite evident that selling of olives by farmers while
the fruit is still ripening on the trees continues to be one of the
most popularly used traditions in olive culture. This conclusion is
based on the facts that (1) farmers continue to rely on this type of
marketing institution despite the temporary ban placed on it during the
1968/69 crop year and (2) other intermediate and final market outlets
are largely used by non-farmers, i.e., middlemen, agents, andlor owners
and operators of olive oil processing facilities. Prices received or
paid by these non-farmers are not considered as an adequate measure of
farm price. A discussion of the Khadara market system of olives in
Tunisia will follow in the latter part of this paper.
When identifying appropriate marketing channels for perishables, a dis-
tinction can be made between two groups of commodities. The first group
includes products which are directly edible with little or no process-
ing required. This group includes products such as fresh fruits and
vegetables which are primarily destined for immediate consumers’ markets,
e.g., citrus, apricots, table grapes, tomatoes, etc. The most essential
market requirement for these kinds of products is to bring them over
time and space to the ultimate consumer at the least possible cost and41
delay. The second group of perishables includes the so-called
agro-industrial products , which include oil olives, wine grapes,
certain oil seeds, and sugar beets. These products require imme-
diate and substantial processing and transformation services before
they can be available for direct use. For these products the link
between agricultural production and industrial processing is an essen-
tial factor in determining the ultimate value and marketability of the
product. Coordination and/or integration between these two separate
activities always should be beneficial in terms of quality and value of
the product, regardless of who controls or owns the product, i.e.,
whether the farm producer or processor.
~1 The nature and cost of these marketing and transformation services in
relation to the market value of the raw olive product will be discussed
later.
5_/ Almost all of the olive crop produced on state farms, Office des Terres
Domaniales (OTD), in Tunisia in the last two years was sold directly
to private buyers via Khadara. Khadara as a market outlet is also
heavily used by a large number of absentee andlor multiple owners of
olive plantations who usually do not take an active role in their farm
production enterprise.
~/ There is insufficient information regarding the extent to which this
practice is actually employed and its effect in dictating the type of
marketing relationship most heavily used by these olive producers.
However, it is conceivable, in a situation where cooperatives or other
mutual government schemes to supply these services are either lacking42
or are inaccessible to farmers with only limited assets, that individual
marketing institutions and/or marketing entrepreneurs could play a sig-
nificant role in determining the scope and type of market outlet to be
made available for their clients.
If Although the price relationship discussed in this section is classified
as hypothetical, it is, nevertheless, linked to the actual wholesale
price of olive oil. This price is fixed by the government at the
beginning of each crop year. The estimates of cost of transformation
which are added to these prices are based on a partial survey of several
processing and marketing facilities by the author.
~/ The wholesale price of olive oil used in Table 1 is the guaranteed
minimum price for Super quality oil paid by the N(IH. The guaranteed
minimum producer-wholesale prices of olive oil (or price advances) are
specified according to quality of oil measured in terms of maximum
percent content of free fatty acids (ffa). These fixed prices are as
follows: 280 dinars per ton for Super (0.7% ffa); 270 dinars per ton
for Extra (1,0% ffa); 260 dinars per ton for Fine (1.5% ffa); 255
dinars per ton for Ordinary (3.3% ffa); 250 dinars per ton for Lampante
(more than 3.3% ffa). This set of fixed prices has not changed over
the last three years. A price supplement, however, in addition to the
fixed minimum price is also paid at the end of the marketing season.
These supplements have varied considerably from year to year and ranged
between 5 and 30 percent of the original minimum fixed price.
~/ The implication here is, of course, given in the conventional free
competitive market model. The critical assumptions made in this case43
are (1) perfect knowledge about the market, (2) easy entry and/or
exit into the processing and marketing industries, (3) absence of
institutional or structural barriers in trading the product.
10/ The traditional Khadara transactions are usually conducted directly —




relationship. In some cases the buyer provides other
to the farmer, such as credit. Information on this
transaction is not available at the present time.
11/ Unofficial reports indicate that —
produced in Tunisia are normally
is subject to verification. The
at least 50 percent of the olives
marketed through Khadara. This estimate
popularity of the Khadara system is,
however, clearly apparent at olive harvest time when a large number of
public or private announcements concerning olive Khadara appear across
the country.
12/ The number of —
A distinction
trees on each farm offered for Khadara is usually known.
is made between fully grown and productive trees (Walid)
and young or less productive trees (Beshayer). The average minimum
quantity yield of olives per tree offered in Khadara is assumed to be
no less than 10 kilos. An olive production level of less than 10 kilos
per tree is not considered commercially important and, consequently,
all production estimates in this range are eliminated from the Khadara
sample.
13/ — In some cases, the OTD specifies a “target value” for each farm sale
presumably based on the most “realistic” estimate of the crop on the44
trees multiplied by a target unit price. Neither the value nor the
price target is revealed to the expected buyer at the time of sale.
There are also certain considerations which influence the final
estimation of the target value, such as the availability and cost of
labor required for harvesting, farm location, and the cost of trans-
portation from the farm to the processing plant. The influence of
these target estimates on the final sale transaction and/or their
realization is not known.
14/ Although it might appear that the overall oil yield of olives produced .
in Sfax is higher than that of the rest of Tunisia, the actual difference
in yields between regions or localities is not known exactly (or is not
sufficiently accurate to be documented). Generally, however, the final
oil yield of any particular olives depends on (1) variety, (2) degree
of maturity, and (3) moisture content of the olives at harvest time.
Consequently, olives of the same variety which are produced under similar
climatic conditions should yield similar or at least a comparable quan-
tity of oil regardless of their place of origin. In Tunisia, two prin-
cipal varieties of oil olives are produced: “Chetwi,” which is mainly
cultivated in the northern part of the country, and “Chemlali,” which
is produced in the central and southern parts. Hence, it is reasonable
to assume that oil yields should be comparable within adjacent producing
areas of central and southern Tunisia where environmental conditions
are almost identical (e.g., Sfax, Sousse, and Kairouan).
15/ Although the reliability of these oil yield estimates might be challenged, —
their quotation andfor acceptance by the seller as a base value in the45
sale transaction merit their consideration as a key element in the
Khadara institution as it is now practiced in the olive culture of
Tunisia.
16/ At the beginning of each production season the Tunisian government —
announces the guaranteed minimum prices of olive oil according to
quality. These fixed prices (or price advances) are paid by the
National Office of Oil (NOH) upon receipt of the oil from the seller.
A reference on the specification of these prices is noted in
footnote ~/ above.
17/ Although this empirical test of the efficiency of Khadara pricing —
might not be complete, it does provide strong empirical evidence
relative to the nature of the unsystematic relationship which presently
prevails between the organized and totally regulated market prices of
olive oil (final product), on one hand, and the less organized and
largely unknown Khadara price of olives (primary product), on the
other hand.
18/ — Except for Sfax and Sousse, market prices reported are point prices
which were quoted in the respective regions at the time of Khadara.
This is explained by the fact that the Sfax market center is the only
one of its type in all Tunisia. This market opens daily during the
harvesting season and shipments of olives of different sizes are brought
in from across the country for immediate selling. In this market,
prices are “competitively” determined for individual transactions.
Sousse has no organized market for olives similar to the one in Sfax.
However, casual market centers are sometimes organized on a temporary46
basis in order to receive small shipments of olives from local areas.
The prices in these markets are determined solely by one or two buyers.
19/ The negative difference between average market and Khadara prices of —
olives might be attributed to better quality control of the oil
expected from the harvesting-processing which is more feasible via
Khadara purchase of olives which is in contrast to direct purchase
of olives from the market where the quality of olives is less known.
20/ The calculation of a standardized distribution of normal prices (in —
terms of average of standard deviation over mean price) is based on
the observed yields between 17 and 28 percent, the equivalent calcu-
lated prices between 43 and 74 dinars per ton harvested olives at
280 dinars per ton oil. This yields an average price of 58 dinars per
ton olives with a standard deviation of 9.79 dinars or about 17 percent
of the mean price. The statistical assumption in this test implies that
measurement errors in the reported data should be randomly distributed.
21/ The “histogram” is used here to show the distribution and percent —
frequency of the Khadara prices along the 100 percent value equivalent
of oil (i.e., Khadara price = value equivalent price). This graphic
distribution displays the conformity (or deviation) of the Khadara
prices reported to the normal distribution test along their correspond-
ing values.
22/ The probability inference which might be drawn from this graphic dis- —
tribution indicates that there is an 80 percent likelihood a Khadara
price would be inferior to the corresponding value price, ceteris
paribus.